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McEvily: The New Bankruptcy Act: A Revision of Section 67d-The Death of a

THE NEW BANKRUPTCY ACT:
A REVISION OF SECTION 67dTHE DEATH OF A DILEMMA*
A primary goal of bankruptcy law is to secure fair distribution of a bankrupt's assets among its creditors.- This goal may be
frustrated if a debtor satisfies one debt prior to another, or conceals
or disposes of property to deprive creditors of their rights.2 A
debtor may prefer, for example, to pay one creditor-a relative or
someone with whom the debtor wants to continue to do
business--over other, less favored creditors. Or a debtor may wish
to avoid all debts and attempt to convey his or her property to prevent the trustee from acquiring title.
To prevent these inequities, the Bankruptcy Act 3 (the Act)
provides two methods for a trustee to recapture assets which are
unfairly transferred: section 60, which applies to voidable prefer5
ences;4 and section 67d, which applies to fraudulent conveyances.
* The author wishes to thank Professor Alan Resnick of the Hofstra University
School of Law for his advice and support throughout the preparation of this Note.
1. Wilson v. City Bank, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 473, 480 (1873) ("The primary object
[of a bankruptcy law] is to secure a just distribution of the bankrupt's property
among his creditors .... ").
2. See text accompanying notes 24 & 48 infra.
3. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (current version at 11
U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976)).
4. Bankruptcy Act § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976), provides in part:
(a)(1) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the
property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an
antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and
within four months before the filing by or against him of the petition
initiating a proceeding under this title, the effect of which transfer will be to
enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some
other creditor of the same class.
(b) Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor
receiving it or to be benefited thereby or his agent acting with reference
thereto has, at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent.
5. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976), provides:
(2) Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor
within one year prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under
this title by or against him is fraudulent (a) as to creditors existing at the
time of such transfer or obligation, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, without re537
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The trustee must prove eight elements to recapture the debtor's assets as a "preferential transfer." 6 Most significant are the re-

quirements that the transfer satisfy an antecedent debt and take7
place within four months of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

The debtor's property may be recovered as a "fraudulent conveyance"8 if the debt was satisfied within one year of the declaration of

bankruptcy, and either (1) the debtor actually intended to defraud
other creditors by making the transfer, or (2) if no such intent ex-

isted, there was no fair consideration because the creditor who was
paid lacked good faith. In the latter case fraud will be presumed. 9
The different elements required by each provision underscore

a distinction between the two sections long recognized as important. 10

Unfortunately,

the fair-consideration

requirement' 1

in-

cluded within the definition of fraudulent conveyances has blurred
this distinction.' 2 The requirement was designed to prevent depletion of the bankrupt's estate, either through improvidence or with

the intention of depriving creditors or favoring friends, shortly begard to his actual intent; or (b) as to then existing creditors and as to other
persons who become creditors during the continuance of a business or transaction, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who is engaged or is about to engage in such business or transaction, for which the
property remaining in his hands is an unreasonably small capital, without regard to his actual intent; or (c) as to then existing and future creditors, if
made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who intends to incur or believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature; or (d) as to then existing and future creditors, if made or incurred with
actual intent as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay,
or defraud either existing or future creditors.
6. For the text of the statutory provision concerning preferential transfers, see
note 4 supra.
7. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1976).
8. For the text of the statutory provision concerning fraudulent conveyances,
see note 5 supra.
9. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976).
10. See Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913); Coder
v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 241 (1909).
11. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(e), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(e) (1976), provides:
[Consideration given for the property or obligation of a debtor is "fair" (1)
when, in good faith, in exchange and as a fair equivalent therefor, property
is transferred or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or (2) when such property or
obligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in an amount not disproportionately small as compared with the
value of the property or obligation obtained.
12. See Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of America, 468 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972);
Gilmer v. Woodson, 332 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964); Nicklaus v. Peoples Bank & Trust
Co., 258 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ark. 1965), affd, 369 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1966).
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fore filing the bankruptcy petition. 13 To be "fair," consideration

given in exchange for the transfer made or obligation incurred by
the debtor must be an equivalent value given in good faith. 14 The
subjectivity and vagueness inherent in the concept of good faith

has produced inconsistent decisions and confusion-and enabled
one court to label a transfer a fraudulent conveyance to nullify a

preference not voidable under the statute. 15
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197816 (the New

Act) attempts to clarify this distinction by omitting the subjective
requirement of fair consideration. It contains essentially the same
elements as section 67d(2) of the present Act, 17 but includes meaningful changes. Initially, it reverses the order of the elements of a
fraudulent conveyance, placing first, rather than last, the require-

ment of actual intent of the debtor-transferor to defraud creditors.
The more significant alteration is the substitution of "reasonably

equivalent value" for "fair consideration.'

18

"Value" is defined as

13. Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 1959); Cole
v. Loma Plastics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 138, 140 (N.D. Tex. 1953).
14. Cohen v. Sutherland, 257 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1958); see 4 W.M. COLLiER, BANKRUPTCY
67.33, at 506 (14th ed. 1978).
15. See Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of America, 468 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972).
16. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 548, 92 Stat. 2549 (to
be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 548). Section 548 provides in part:
Fraudulent transfers and obligations
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on
or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the
debtor(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on
or after the date that such transfer occurred or such obligation was incurred,
indebted; or
(2) (A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer or obligation; and
(B) (i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or
obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business, or was about to engage in business or a
transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts
that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
17. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976). For the text of this
provision, see note 5 supra.
18. Compare Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 548, 92
Stat. 2549 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 548), see note 16 supra, with Bankruptcy Act
§ 67(d)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976), see note 5 supra.
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"property or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent
debt of the debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise
to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor." 19
Thus, nowhere in the New Act do fair consideration or good faith
appear. Fraud can still be presumed, but only on the basis of the
value exchanged, regardless of the existence of good faith. This
modification should eliminate judicial confusion by providing a
more objective standard-limiting the latitude formerly accorded
the trier of fact, 20 and restoring the distinction between preferential transfers and fraudulent conveyances.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES

Although the roots of bankruptcy law reach back to the fourteenth century, when Italian city-states had well-developed procedures for dealing with defaulting debtors, 21 our notions of fraudulent conveyances are traced back to the Statute of Elizabeth,
enacted in England in 1570.22 It declared that conveyances "to the
end, purpofe and intent, to delay, hinder or defraud creditors . . .
of their juft and lawful . . . debts" were "clearly and utterly void,

fruftrate, and of none effect." 23 Thus the law of fraudulent conveyances was not developed primarily to further the goal of equitable
distribution, 24 rather it was to foil debtors intending to defraud
creditors. Early American enactments, as well as present day codi25
fications, repeated both the words and sentiment.
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act clarified and broadened the scope of the statutes that descended from the Statute of
Elizabeth. 26 The draftsmen of the Chandler Act 2 7 incorporated the
19. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
2549 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)).

§ 548(d)(2), 92 Stat.

20. Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823, 829-30, 830 n.5 (5th Cir.
1959) (quoting W.M. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 845 (1948)).
21. See J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 20 (1956);

Note, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REv. 223 (1918).
22. An Act Againft Fraudulent Deeds, Alienations, &c., 1570, 13 Eliz., c. 5. See
Hartman, A Survey of the FraudulentConveyance in Bankruptcy, 38 REF. J. 68, 68

(1964).
23.
1,2.
24.

An Act Againft Fraudulent Deeds, Alienations, &c., 1570, 13 Eliz., c. 5, 9
J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 21, at 275.

25. See, e.g., Act for the Prevention of Frauds, 1787 N.Y. Laws 381 (current version at N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 273-276 (McKinney 1945 & Supp. 1978-1979)).
26. Hartman, supra note 22, at 68.

27. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (codified in scattered sections of
11, 18 U.S.C.).
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essential portions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act into
the Bankruptcy Act. 28 In addition, they added three new clauses,
now found in section 67d(2), 2 9 which permit a presumption of fraud
in three situations when the transfer is made "without fair consideration." 30 Section 67d(1)(e) defines consideration as fair:
(1) when, in good faith, in exchange and as a fair equivalent
therefor, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is
satisfied, or (2) when such property or obligation is received in
good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in an
amount not disproportionately small as compared with the value
of the property or obligation obtained. 31
Both good faith and a fair equivalent value are elements of this definition. 32 Good faith is a question of fact, 33 its existence determined by the circumstances of each case. 3 4 As a result, the term
has never been adequately defined, because it lacks a predictable
35
base from which to determine its presence or absence.
28. 4 W.M. COLLIER, supra note 14, 67.23, at 475 n.6. See also In re Vanity
Fair Shoe Corp., 84 F. Supp. 533, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 179 F.2d 766 (2d Cir.
1950).
29. Former section 67e, Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 67e, 30 Stat.
544 (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976)), provided:
That all conveyances, transfers, assignments, or incumbrances of his
property, or any part thereof, made or given by a person adjudged a bankrupt under the provisions of this Act subsequent to the passage of this Act
and within four months prior to the filing of the petition, with the intent and
purpose on his part to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or any of them,
shall be null and void as against the creditors of such debtor, except as to
purchasers in good faith and for a present fair consideration; and all property
of the debtor conveyed, transferred, assigned, or encumbered as aforesaid
shall, if he be adjudged a bankrupt, and the same is not exempt from execution and liability for debts by the law of his domicile, be and remain a part
of the assets and estate of the bankrupt and shall pass to his said trustee,
whose duty it shall be to recover and reclaim the same by legal proceedings
or otherwise for the benefit of the creditors.
Compare id. with Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976). See note 5
supra.
30. See Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(a)-(c), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a)-(c)(1976).
31. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(e), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(e) (1976); see note 11 supra.
32. Cohen v. Sutherland, 257 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1958); see 4 W.M. COLLIER, supra note 14, 67.33, at 506.
33. Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 444 (1917); Inland See. Co. v. Estate of
Kirshner, 382 F. Supp. 338, 348 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
34. See Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of America, 468 F.2d 11, 13 (7th Cir. 1972);
Holahan v. Henderson, 277 F. Supp. 890, 899 (W.D. La. 1967), affd, 394 F.2d 177
(5th Cir. 1968).
35. 4 W.M. COLLIER, supra note 14, 67.41, at 589.
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As to whose "good faith" should be examined, one court has
asserted: "The act includes in the definition of fair consideration
the element of good faith on the part of the transferee of the property in question," 36 since the transferee can best assess the fairness
of the situation. 37 The language of the Act's definition of fair consideration supports this interpretation: "[C]onsideration given for
the property or obligation of a debtor is 'fair' (1) when, in good
faith in exchange and as a fair equivalent therefor, property is
transferred or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or (2) when such
property is received in good faith to secure a present advance or
antecedent debt ....
"38 The definition refers to that which is
given for property of the debtor, and requires good faith by the
creditor-transferee when conveying property in exchange for property of the debtor-transferor, or when receiving property of the
debtor to secure an advance or antecedent debt.
The fair-equivalent requirement of fair consideration varies ac39
cording to the nature of the property involved in the transaction.
Substantial disparity between the values of the property exchanged
40
may indicate bad faith.
Thus, in determining the presence of good faith, and of fair
consideration, considerable latitude is given to the trier of fact. 41
This latitude, which results from the lack of definition of good
faith, has produced inconsistent outcomes and, consequently, a
blurring of the distinction between preferential and fraudulent
42
transfers.
PREFERENCES

A preference occurs when a debtor transfers property to a
creditor in satisfaction of an existing debt, thereby favoring that
creditor by precluding other creditors from obtaining the property.
There is nothing inherently wrong with such a transfer; thus, it
may be avoided only if all the elements contained in section 60
are present.43 The law of preferences has been described as the
36. In re Messenger, 32 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
37. G. GLENN, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 395 (1931).

38. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(e), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(e) (1976) (emphasis
added).
39. J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 21, at 271.
40. See id.
41.
1959).
42.
43.
supra.

See Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823, 829-30 (5th Cir.
See cases cited note 12 supra.
For the text of the provisions concerning preferential transfers, see note 4
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single greatest contribution of the Bankruptcy Act to the field of
commercial law, because it weakens inducements to negotiate preferential transfers with insolvent debtors.4 Daniel Webster recognized its importance in the earliest bankruptcy laws: "[T]he right of
preference is the foundation upon which the structure [of unsound
credit] rests!"45 In addition to providing a barrier to the business
disruptions caused by aggressive collection, 4 6 the preference law
attempts to afford an adequate remedy to less favored creditors
who have no recourse under state law:4 7 "The object of prohibiting
preferences is to prevent favoritism, whether for secret benefit to
himself or other reason, among a debtor's creditors, who ought, in
fairness, to stand on the same footing." 48 To achieve this goal,
Congress enacted section 60,4 9 empowering the trustee to challenge transfers made up to four months prior to bankruptcy. 50
Section 60a defines a preference as a transfer of the debtor's
property within four months of filing a petition for bankruptcy, to
or for the benefit of a creditor, for oiT on account of an antecedept
debt, that enables the creditor to get a greater percentage of his or
her debt satisfied than other creditors in the same class. 51 To avoid
the preference, the trustee must prove that the preferred creditor
had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at
the time of transfer.52
A transfer may be both a fraudulent conveyance and a voidable preference. This usually occurs when the debtor actually intends to defraud creditors; 53 thus, fraud is not merely presumed
because of a lack of good faith on the part of the creditor. 54 In such
cases, a trustee may proceed under section 60 or section 67d or
44. J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 21, at 284.
45. CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 814 app. (1840), quoted in J.
MACLACHLAN, supra note 21, at 284.
46. J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 21, at 3. The preference law is commonly
referred to as the "grab" law.
47. Id. at 284.
48. Furth v. Stahl, 205 Pa. 439, 442, 55 A. 29, 30 (1903).
49. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 60, 30 Stat. 544 (amended 1950)
(current version at 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976)).
50. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1976). Although the New
Act will change the applicable time period, discussion of these changes is not relevant here.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(d) (1976). See note 5
supra.
54. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(a)-(c), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a)-(c) (1976). See note 5
supra.
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both. Under section 60a, the elements of a preference must be established, 55 including that the transfer occurred within four months
of bankruptcy. The preference is not voidable unless the creditor
or his or her agent had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor
was insolvent at the time of transfer. 56 Under section 67d(2)(d), a
of
trustee must prove that the transfer occurred within one year
57
bankruptcy, and that the debtor intended to defraud creditors.
Although both provisions focus on the insolvency of the debtor
and the creditor's belief or intent, they contain distinct requirements as well. A notable difference between the two sections is the
applicable time limitation: four months for preferential transfers;
one year for fraudulent conveyances. Thus, if the preferential
transfer of an asset from a debtor to a creditor occurs outside the
four month limitation, the transaction will not be considered a
voidable preference. In addition, a preference involves satisfaction
of an antecedent debt, 58 while a fraudulent conveyance may concern a simultaneous exchange between the debtor and the
creditor-the question being the consideration given. 59
Although transfers may be fraudulent as well as preferential,
the two concepts are not necessarily connected. In fact, examination of the provisions of sections 60 and 67d demonstrates a wide
difference between them: "[An intent to prefer is not to be confounded with an intent to defraud, nor a preferential transfer with
a fraudulent one." 60 An intent to prefer is not wrong in itself, but a
preferential transfer may be avoided once the required elements
are proved. 61
IMPORTANCE OF THE DISTINCTION

Courts have recognized the distinction between the requisite
intent of the transferee for preferences and fraudulent conveyances
since the formulation of bankruptcy laws. In the early case of
Coder v. Arts, 62 the mortgage in question effected a preference;
however, it was not voidable, because neither the mortgagee nor
his agent had reasonable cause to believe the debtor insol55.

Bankruptcy Act § 60a, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1976). See note 4 supra.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Bankruptcy Act § 60b, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1976). See note 4 supra.
Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(d) (1976).
Bankruptcy Act § 60a, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1976).
Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(a)-(c), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a)-(c) (1976).
Githens v. Shiffler, 112 F. 505, 508 (1902).
See Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913).
213 U.S. 223 (1909).
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vent. 63 The trustee, upon failing to recapture the property as a
voidable preference, proceeded as if it were a fraudulent conveyance. 6 4 He argued that since a preference necessarily results in delaying, hindering, or defrauding creditors, the debtor must be presumed to intend such consequences; thus he maintained that the
preference was voidable as a fraudulent conveyance. 65 The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, because a finding of actual intent to defraud was necessary to avoid a transfer under the applicable statute. 66 The Court asserted that although preferences and
conveyances are often "spoken of in such a way as to confuse one
with the other," 67 there is a definite distinction between them:
Preferences are "not necessarily fraudulent," but "are set aside
when made within four months, with a view to obtaining an equal
68
distribution of the [bankrupt's] estate."
In Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co.,69 another early
case, the trustee tried to avoid a conveyance because the transferee
knew that the debtor intended a preference. Rejecting this argument, the Court explained that it is "not in itself unlawful to prefer." 70 It articulated the differences between a preference dnd a
fraudulent conveyance: "One is inherently and always vicious; the
other is innocent and valid, except when made in violation of the
express provisions of a statute. One is malum per se and the other
is malum prohibitum,-andthen only to the extent that it is forbid71
den."
Twenty years later in Irving Trust Co. v. Chase National
Bank, 72 the Second Circuit reemphasized the need for establishing
actual intent of the debtor to defraud prior to finding a conveyance
fraudulent. Again, the trustee did not succeed in persuading the
court to convert a nonvoidable preference into a fraudulent conveyance:
The facts alleged show only a nonvoidable preference, and the

additional allegation that the debtor intended to defraud his
63. Id. at 240.
64. See Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 67e, 30 Stat. 544 (amended
1950) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976)); note 29 supra.
65. 213 U.S. at 241.
66. Id. at 244.
67. Id. at 241.
68. Id.
69. 227 U.S. 575 (1913).

70. Id. at 582.
71.
72.

Id.
65 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1933).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1979

9

Hofstra
Law
Review,
Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1979],[Vol.
Art. 7:11537
REVIEW
LAW
HOFSTRA

creditors, without showing how they were to be hindered or defrauded except as incidental to the preference, would not, in our
opinion, be sufficient to convert the transaction into a fraudulent
73

conveyance.
Thus the preference's necessary consequence of hindering and delaying creditors did not establish proof of the debtor's intent to defraud. The creditor bank that received the transfer in repayment of
a loan was not compelled to surrender the money.
Nicklaus v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. 74 is a more recent
case decided under present section 67d. The defendant bank
learned that the value of the security it held for a loan to the bankrupt was less than the amount of the loan. It also discovered that
some bills of lading with drafts attached by the bankrupt corporation had been returned unpaid. The bank demanded payment on
the bankrupt's note and received a credit at his broker and a cashier's check. The bankrupt had procured the check through credit
he had obtained from another bank 'by depositing spurious bills of
lading. The defendant bank had no notice that the bankrupt had
obtained this credit. 75

The funds could not be recovered as a preference, because four
months had lapsed since the transfer. However, the payment received by the bank would have constituted a preference if it bad
been made within four months of bankruptcy. Since the bank had
inquiry notice of the bankrupt's insolvency, the trustee argued that
it was charged with knowledge that the bankrupt could not
have obtained the payment without committing fraud.76 Under
these circumstances, according to the trustee, the bank could not
have been acting in good faith, and the satisfaction of the anteced77
ent debt lacked fair consideration.
The court refused to accept this reasoning, stating that "a preferential payment to a creditor does not in itself constitute a fraudulent conveyance." 7 8 The bank did not possess actual knowledge
that the bankrupt had committed fraud and the court would not infer knowledge from the bank's notice of the debtor's insolvency. 79
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 412.
258 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ark. 1965), affd, 369 F.2d .683 (8th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 484-85.
Id. at 485.
Id.
Id. at 486.
Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss2/11

10

1979]

NEW
BANKRUPTCY
ACT
McEvily: The New
Bankruptcy
Act: A
Revision of Section 67d-The Death of a

Since section 60 was not applicable, knowledge of the bankrupt's
insolvency was irrelevant. Furthermore, the court did not construe
fair consideration under section 67d(1)(e) ° to mean "a creditor
does not act 'in good faith' in receiving a cashier's check and applying it to the satisfaction of antecedent debt merely because he
suspects that the debtor making the payment is insolvent." 8' While
the court might have found bad faith if the bank had knowledge, or
reasonable cause to believe, that the debtor had committed fraud,
it refused to equate the knowledge of insolvency required to avoid
a preference with the lack of good faith required to avoid a fraudulent conveyance.
Thus, although both sections of the Act promote equitable distribution, they do so in different ways. The law of preferences
seeks to prevent favoritism among creditors by empowering a trustee to avoid a transfer which is not unlawful in itself. As defined in
section 60a, a preference is not prohibited; it is only unlawful if
made within the time period and under the conditions specified in
section 60b. s2 A fraudulent conveyance, however, contains no escape hatch, since it involves no effort to pay a valid debt. The
debtor-transferor who conveys assets to defraud creditors is generally attempting to benefit only him- or herself. Due to the importance attached to preventing fraudulent conveyances, even if a
transferee gives a fair equivalent value, and has no reason to suspect fraud, property transferred may be recaptured if the debtor
intends to defraud creditors. s3 On the other hand, a preferential
transfer is not voidable if the transferee has no reason to suspect
that the debtor is insolvent: It would be unfair to require an innocent transferee to forfeit property which was thought to be legally
obtained.
BULLARD V. ALUMINUM CO. OF AMERICA

The blurring of the distinction between preferential and fraudulent transfers is illustrated in a Seventh Circuit case, Bullard v.
Aluminum Co. of America. 84 The subjective element of good faith
required for fair consideration enabled the court to avoid, as a
fraudulent conveyance, a transfer that was in reality a nonvoidable
preference.
80. See note 11 supra.
81.
82.

258 F. Supp. at 486.
See note 4 supra.

83. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(d) (1976).
84. 468 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972).
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Alcoa, the defendant corporation, appealed a summary judgment which held that the transfer in question was fraudulent under
section 67d(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. 85 Kritzer Radiant, the
bankrupt corporation, was insolvent at the time of the transfer and
owed Alcoa more than $46,000 on a note personally guaranteed by
the president of Kritzer Radiant. Alcoa had received a judgment in
state court against the president for the amount of the note.8s The
transfer consisted of payment by Kritzer Radiant to Alcoa of fifty
cents on the dollar in full satisfaction of the debt owed on the note.
In addition to releasing the corporation from its obligation to pay
the debt, Alcoa released the president of the corporation from the
87
judgment against him.
After asserting that section 67d(2)(a), which deals with presumed fraud, is the applicable provision, the court formulated the
issue: "[T]he question becomes, under the undisputed facts as set
forth above, whether the transfer from Kritzer Radiant to Alcoa
was for 'fair consideration.' "88 Thus the court did not address
whether the debtor actually intended the transfer to defraud creditors. 89
The court maintained that fair consideration requires both fair
equivalent value and good faith; the existence of good faith depends on whether the transaction is made at arm's length. Even if
fair equivalent value were present, a transfer lacking good faith
would be fraudulent. Considering the undisputed facts, and noting
the relationship between the parties to the settlement, the court
concluded that the transfer lacked fair consideration and thus was
fraudulent.90 Citing United Towing Co. v. Phillips,9 ' the court
found that transfers to benefit third parties are not made in exchange for fair consideration. Since the president of Kritzer Radiant "was released entirely and without any consideration on his
'2
part from a legally enforceable state court judgment against him,"
the benefit ran to him, not to the corporation. Therefore, there
85. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(a), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a) (1976).
86.
87.
88.

89.
intent to
90.
91.
92.

468 F.2d at 12.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13.

Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(d)t1976), requires actual
defraud on the part of the debtor to avoid a conveyance as fraudulent.
Id. at 13-14.
242 F.2d 627 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 861 (1957).
468 F.2d at 14.
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was no fair consideration for the 93transfer, rendering it fraudulent
under section 67d(2)(a) of the Act.
An examination of the Seventh Circuit's analysis reveals that
there was, in fact, fair consideration for the transfer. The requirement of good faith to establish fair consideration enabled the court
to void a nonvoidable preference by describing it as a fraudulent
conveyance after manipulating the facts to find a lack of good faith.
Fair consideration requires both fair equivalent value and good
faith. 94 The definition itself,95 as well as precedent, 96 indicates that
it is the good faith of the transferee that is at issue. The court in
Bullard failed to indicate whether its decision was premised on
Alcoa's lack of good faith, or its failure to give fair equivalent
value.9 7 Although the court implied that its holding was based, in
part, on the presence of bad faith,98 it refused to focus specifically
on Alcoa's intent, 99 asserting that the section of the Act involved
rendered the transfer fraudulent "irrespective of the intent of the
parties to the transaction." 100 If Alcoa's intent had been examined,
the court would have found good faith. The existence of good faith
is determined at the time of transfer of the debtor's assets to the
creditor;101 the transaction occurred almost a year before the petition of bankruptcy was filed. There is no evidence that Alcoa knew
or could have known at that time that Kritzer Radiant would go
bankrupt. Although correspondence between Alcoa and its attorneys indicates that Alcoa was aware of possible financial difficulties,' 0 2 mere suspicion of insolvency does not constitute bad
faith. 10 3 Suspicion or knowledge of insolvency is not suspicion or
93. Id.
94. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
95. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
96. See Gilmer v. Woodson, 332 F.2d 541, 547 (4th Cir. 1964); Holahan v.
Henderson, 277 F. Supp. 890, 897 (W.D. La. 1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 177 (5th Cir.
1968); In re Messenger, 32 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
97. The court merely stated that on the facts it agreed with the district court
that "the transfer here was a fraudulent one within the meaning of § 67(d)(2)(a) of
the Bankruptcy Act." 468 F.2d at 14.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 14.
100. Id.
101. Cohen v. Sutherland, 257 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1958); In re Southern
Land Title Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1059, 1064 (E.D. La. 1970); see 4 W.M. COLLIER, supra note 14, 67.33, at 509-10.
102. 468 F.2d at 13.
103. In Nicklaus v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 258 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ark.
1965), aff'd, 369 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1966), the court stated: "I do not believe that un-
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knowledge of fraud.10 4 Since bankruptcy was not a certainty when
the agreement was made, Alcoa's release of both the corporation
and its president for only half the debt owed left Kritzer Radiant
with more funds with which to alleviate its financial difficulties.
From this perspective, at least, Alcoa was not acting in a bad faith.
Other common law interpretations support the conclusion that
Alcoa acted in good faith. In Gilmer v. Woodson,10 5 under circumstances similar to those in Bullard, the Fourth Circuit stated:
"[Good faith cannot be said to be lacking unless the transferee
knowingly participated in the debtor-transferor's purpose to defeat
other creditors or lacked good faith in valuing the property exchanged."106 In Bullard whether Kritzer Radiant intended to defeat creditors through the transfer was not an issue in the case.
Since this purpose was never established, Alcoa cannot be said to
have participated in such a scheme. The transferee's valuation of
the property he exchanged seemed to be in good faith: An agreement in accord and satisfaction is a recognized method of settlement among creditors and debtors. 10 7 The transfer was not indicative of lack of good faith by the transferee in valuing the property
exchanged, since settling for fifty cents on the dollar represents a
customary settlement between a creditor and an insolvent debtor;
thus, there was no substantial disparity between the values of the
property exchanged.' 08
In Holahan v. Henderson,'0 9 the Fifth Circuit ruled that consideration is fair "if it was received [by the creditor] in good faith
for an antecedent debt.""10 It is ironic that the court in Bullard ignored this definition of fair consideration, refusing to consider the
transferee's good faith, yet cited Holahan for the assertion that
der the definition of 'fair consideration' set out in § 67(d)(1)(e) a creditor does not act
'in good faith' . . . merely because he suspects that the debtor making the payment is
insolvent." Id. at 486.
104. Id. Although a creditor's suspicion or knowledge of insolvency is insufficient to avoid a fraudulent conveyance, "reasonable cause to believe that the debtor
is insolvent" is necessary to avoid a preference. Bankruptcy Act § 60b, 11 U.S.C. §
96(b) (1976).
105. 332 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964).
106. Id. at 547 (citation omitted).
107. See, e.g., Geeslin v. Knight Bros., Inc., 554 F.2d 865 (8th Cir. 1977);
Engbretson v. Seiberling, 122 Iowa 522, 98 N.W. 319 (1904); Sigler v. Sigler, 98 Kan.
524, 158 P. 864 (1916).
108. See J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 21, at 271.
109. 277 F. Supp. 890 (W.D. La. 1967), affd, 394 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1968).
110. Id. at 897 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss2/11

14

BANKRUPTCY
NEWBankruptcy
McEvily: The New
Act:ACT
A Revision of Section 67d-The Death of a

1979]

good faith depends on whether the "transaction carries the earmarks of an arms-length bargain."'
In addition, the intent referred to in section 67d(2)(a)irrelevant to operation of the section-is the actual intent of the
debtor, not, as the court concluded, the intent of the creditor. Regardless of the debtor's intent, lack of fair consideration by the
creditor will render the transfer fraudulent. But the intent of the
creditor is very much an issue under this section. A transfer in
which the creditor gives fair equivalent value can be fraudulent
only if the creditor lacks good faith. The relationship between actual intent and fair consideration, as found in sections 67d(2)(a),(b),
and (c), was appropriately described by the district court in In re
Southern Land Title Corp.:112 "The first three situations, from
which fraud is conclusively presumed, regardless of actual intent,
have one common prerequisite of an absence of 'fair consideration'
to the debtor in returnfor his conveyance. Lack of proof that there
was an absence of 'fair consideration' is fatal to the presumption
"113

The Bullard court, on one hand asserted the necessity
of good faith, and, on the other, refused to examine whether Alcoa
had met this requirement. The court may have relied on the absence of fair equivalent value to conclude that no fair consideration
was given; if it did, this reliance was misplaced. The value of the
property exchanged was not an issue before the court. Furthermore, fair consideration is judged quantitatively with regard to the
114
type of property in question, as well as to other circumstances.
Under the circumstances as described by the court, an agreement
in accord and satisfaction, settling for fifty cents on the dollar, is
not the kind of price that should excite suspicion of bad faith. It
has long been a practice for creditors, who fear that a debtor's financial difficulties will interfere with the collection of a debt, to
settle for less than the contract price.115 Rather than indicating bad
faith, forgiveness of half what actually is owed can be viewed favor111. 468 F.2d at 13 (quoting Holahan v. Henderson, 277 F. Supp. 890, 899
(W.D. La. 1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1968)).
112.

316 F. Supp. 1059 (E.D. La. 1970).

113. Id. at 1062 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
114. Id. at 1063-64. See also Cohen v. Sutherland, 257 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir.
1958); J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 21, at 271.

115. See, e.g., Engbretson v. Seiberling, 122 Iowa 522, 98 N.W. 319 (1904);
Sigler v. Sigler, 98 Kan. 524, 158 P. 864 (1916); Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N.Y. 164, 26
N.E. 351 (1891).
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ably. The creditor elects not to sue the debtor for the full contract
price, relieving the debtor of an obligation at a loss to him- or herself. Furthermore, since it is not unlawful in itself to prefer, 116 it
should not be unlawful to be preferred by altering the terms of the
contract to receive part payment of the debt in return for
discharging the debtor, especially if satisfaction occurs more than
four months prior to bankruptcy. Although this may enable some
creditors to receive more than others, thereby resulting in an inequitable distribution of the debtor's assets, the statute's four-month
preference period is a recognition that there is a point beyond
which it becomes impracticable and undesirable to void transactions.
The Bullard court's conclusion that fair consideration was not
given ultimately rests on the consideration having run to a third
party. 117 This argument seems to combine both the quantitative
and good faith elements of fair consideration. Although one court
has held to the contrary, 118 transfers made for the benefit of third
parties generally are not made for "fair" consideration."19 However, the consideration at issue in Bullard did not solely benefit
the president of the bankrupt corporation. Indiana state law provided that a surety may recover from the principal any amount of
the principal's debt it is forced to pay. 120 If the president had not
been released, he would have had a claim against Kritzer Radiant
Corporation for the amount of the judgment against him. Thus, the
only effective way to release the corporation was to release its president as well.
The court may have considered it bad faith for the president
to use his position to have the corporation pay a debt for which he
was guarantor. However, close corporations such as Kritzer Radiant
generally are not granted loans unless an agent of the corporation
accepts personal liability. And it is unfair to compel the president
to pay off a note he guarantees for the benefit of the corporation
when the holder of the note agrees to a settlement.
In addition, the existence of good faith generally depends on
116. Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913); Coder v.
Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 241 (1909).
117. 468 F.2d at 14.

118. See Williams v. Twin City Co., 251 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1958).
119. Mayo v. Pioneer & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823, 829 (5th Cir. 1959); Edward
Hines W. Pine Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 61 F.2d 503, 510 (7th Cir. 1932);
Davis v. Hudson Trust Co., 28 F.2d 740, 742 (3d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S.
655 (1927); 4 W.M. COLLIER, supra note 14, 67.33, at 514.1.

120. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-55-8 (Bums 1973).
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whether there was "abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of

the chapter." 121 An important purpose of the Act is to give debtors
a fresh start. 122 Certainly, Alcoa's action did not give Kritzer Radiant a "fresh start," but the settlement did offer Kritzer a reprieve
by relieving the corporation and its president from half the payment due. Inclusion of the president in the settlement was central
to the agreement's effectiveness: If the president had not been released from the judgment, he would have had a valid claim against
Kritzer Radiant.
The above arguments illustrate that there was fair consideration for the agreement between the bankrupt corporation and
Alcoa. An examination of the facts of the case reveals that the situation involved not a conveyance which was fraudulent for lack of fair
consideration, but a preferential transfer which could not be
avoided.
Essentially, the eight elements of a preference 123 were present
in Bullard, except for the four-month limitation.' 2 4 Payment of half
the debt owed to Alcoa undoubtedly was made from Kritzer Radiant's funds' 2 5 and resulted in depleting the corporation's estate.
The payment benefited the creditor, Alcoa, who received half,
rather than none, of the debt due, and it satisfied an antecedent
debt that was owed at the time of transfer. 126 The court of appeals
agreed with the district court that the corporation was definitely insolvent, 12 7 asserting that "Alcoa acquired an advantage over the
other creditors at a time when Alcoa was certainly aware of the
precarious financial position of Kritzer Radiant. "128 Thus, in addition to believing that Alcoa had received more than its ratable
share, the court found that Alcoa had knowledge of Kritzer Radiant's insolvency. The court stated that Alcoa possessed Kritzer Ra121. Salter, "Good Faith," 43 REF. J. 30, 31 (1969).
122. The Supreme Court described this purpose of the Act in Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934): "One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to
'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit
him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon
business misfortunes.'" Id. at 244 (quoting Williams v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)).
123. For a discussion of these elements, see Johnson, A Primer to Voidable
Preferences, 70 COM. L.J. 128 (1965).
124. For the text of the statutory provision concerning preferential transfers,
see note 4 supra; text accompanying notes 51 & 52 supra.
125. 468 F.2d at 12.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 13.
128. Id. at 14.
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diant's financial statement, which reflected its negative net worth.
Furthermore, it quoted from correspondence between Alcoa and
its attorneys that indicated Alcoa's awareness of the possibility that
Kritzer Radiant would go bankrupt.' 2 9 It appears the court deemed
Alcoa's knowledge of Kritzer Radiant's insolvency and its receipt of
more than its ratable share-both elements required for a preference but not for a fraudulent conveyance-to be evidence of
Alcoa's lack of good faith.
Using the Nicklaus court's interpretation of fair consideration,' 30 the court in Bullard would have decided against the trustee. Alcoa's knowledge of Kritzer Radiant's insolvency, presumed
from Alcoa's possession of the financial statement and Alcoa's letter
to its attorneys, would have been irrelevant. If the Bullard court
had conceded that awareness of the debtor's insolvency is not indicative of the creditor's bad faith, it could have maintained the
distinction between sections 60 and 67d-as the Nicklaus court
did.
Seven of the eight elements of a preference were present in
the transfer, but because the transaction occurred more than four
months before bankruptcy, the court was unable to treat it as a
voidable preference. However, the vagueness inherent in the term
"good faith," and the lack of definition supplied by the statute, enabled the Sourt to conclude that Alcoa's presumed knowledge of
Kritzer Radiant's insolvency was indicative of a lack of good
faith. 13 ' The court did not base its holding on Alcoa's knowledge of
insolvency, since such knowlege is insufficient to avoid a conveyance as fraudulent.' 32 Instead, the court asserted that consideration
given to the third-party president, rather than to the transferorcorporation, constitutes evidence of a lack of fair consideration,
thereby rendering the transaction fraudulent.
The requirement of good faith in the definition of fair consideration, and the absence of either a statutory or uniform case law
definition of good faith, permitted the Bullard court to reach its
conclusion. Because the court believed that Alcoa in fact lacked
good faith, it utilized its discretion to interpret the facts and arrive
at what it considered a just result.' 33
129. Id. at 13.
130. See text accompanying notes 74-81 supra.
131. 468 F.2d at 14.
132. Compare Bankruptcy Act § 60a, 11 U.S.C.§ 96(a) (1976) with Bankruptcy
Act § 67d(2), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976); see notes 4 & 5 supra.
133. The Bullard court reasoned: "Since transfers made to benefit third parties

are not considered as made for 'fair' consideration, we agree that on these facts,
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The definition of fair consideration evidently so confused the
court that it was unable to articulate whether the benefit to the
third party rendered the transfer fraudulent for lack of good faith
or fair equivalent value. The court discussed the necessity for good
faith, 134 and then asserted that section 67d(2)(a) renders a transfer
fraudulent "irrespective of the intent of the parties to the transac5
tion." 13
By omitting fair consideration from the definition of a fraudulent conveyance, section 548 of the New Act' 36 should prevent this
kind of reasoning and confusion. The substitution of "reasonably
equivalent value"13 7--with no mention of good faith-should provide a more objective standard. Although a question of fact will remain in each case, precedents defining reasonably equivalent value
should develop more easily, since, unlike good faith, the term is
generally quantifiable.
If the court in Bullard had analyzed only the quantitative element of the settlement between Alcoa and Kritzer Radiant, it
would not have become embroiled in whether Alcoa's knowledge of
the debtor's insolvency represented lack of good faith. Consequently, it could have relied on the accepted practice of settlements in accord and satisfaction of debts, decided that the debtor
had received a "reasonably equivalent value in exchange for [the]
transfer,'

138

and maintained the distinction between voidable pref-

erences and fraudulent conveyances.
THE NEW PROVISION

Section 548(a) of the New Act contains elements similar to
those of section 67d(2) for establishing a fradulent conveyance. 139
However, there are significant changes that relate to the problem
discussed above.
which are not disputed by the defendant, the transfer here was a fraudulent one
within the meaning of § 67d(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act." 468 F.2d at 14 (citation
omitted).
134. Id. at 13.
135. Id. at 14.
136. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 548, 92 Stat. 2549
(to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 548); for text of the statutory provision, see note 16 supra.
137. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 548(2)(A), 92 Stat.
2549 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 548(2)(A)).
138. Id.
139, Compare Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 548, 92
Stat. 2549 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 548) with Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2), 11
U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976); see notes 5 & 16 supra.
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Most notably, it is no longer necessary to address fair consideration in determining whether fraud should be presumed; the
term has been replaced by the requirement of reasonably equivalent value. 140 The substitution of reasonably equivalent value for
section 67d(1)(e)'s fair consideration should allow the trier of fact
less latitude, because it demands that this more objective standard
combine with one of the other necessary conditions before fraud
can be presumed.
Section 548(a) retains the one year statute of limitations. In addition, it requires either actual, as opposed to constructive, fraud,
or receipt of less than reasonably equivalent value and one of three
other conditions: Insolvency, a business left with unreasonably
small capital, or the intent or belief of the debtor that he or she
will incur debts beyond his or her ability to pay.141
Section 548(a)(2) sets out essentially the same provisions as
section 67d(2). 142 An important change is the reversal of the order
of the elements. The standards contained in section 67d(2) appear
to have been arranged in decreasing order of objectivity.1 43 The
last clause adheres most closely to the Statute of Elizabeth-which
refers to the transferor's subjective intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors-while the other clauses simply codify the case law
that arose under the Statute. 144 The order in which the standards
are set forth in section 548(a) indicates an intention to return to the
roots and purpose of the original doctrine.
The law of fraudulent conveyances in bankruptcy was not de145 It
veloped primarily to promote general equitable distribution.
is based on the view that a "wicked thing" has been done. 146 A
debtor either has meant to defraud a creditor, or has acted so recklessly in transferring his or her property without consideration
(now reasonably equivalent value) that fraudulent intent should be
inferred. 147 This purpose is more apparent in the language of section 548(a) than that of section 67d(2). Defining a fraudulent trans140. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
141. See note 16 supra.
142. Compare Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 548(a)t2),

92 Stat. 2549 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)12)) with Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2),
11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976); see notes 5 & 16 supra.
143.
144.
145.
22-25.
146.
147.

J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 21, at 270.
Id. at 275. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 21, at 275. See text accompanying notes
Hartman, supra note 22, at 72.
Id.
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fer primarily as one in which the debtor actually intends to defraud, and secondarily as one in which certain conditions, including
receipt of less than equivalent value, are present, puts a different
emphasis on the elements. This emphasis conforms with the goals
of the original statute.
CONCLUSION

The replacement of section 67d(2) with section 548(a) of the
New Act will alleviate judicial confusion and promote uniformity.
The purpose behind requiring fair consideration-preventing depletion of the bankrupt's estate by improvidence or favoritism immediately preceding bankruptcy' 4 -- will not be frustrated. Moreover, section 548(a) adheres to the intent of Congress to maintain
149
the distinction between preferences and fraudulent conveyances
-between transfers which are malum prohibitum and those which
0
are malum per se. 15
Steph McEvily
148.
149.

See text accompanying note 13 supra.
See Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 243 (1909)

("...

Congress must be pre-

sumed to have intended by the introduction of § 67e to require a surrender only of
such transfers as would have been fraudulent at common law...").
150. Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913).
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